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In Antithetical Arts, Peter Kivy explains how absolute music—“an art of purely 
abstract but perhaps expressive sound”—poses a distinctive problem for the philosophy 
of art: 
All of the other fine arts are, for the most part, arts with literary or 
representational content. And that content plays a major role in accounting 
for what it is in these arts that gives us such deep and abiding satisfaction. 
But absolute music does not possess such content. So it is a puzzle as to 
what it is in or about absolute music gives what appears, at least, to be the 
same kind of deep satisfaction that the other arts, the arts with content, give. 
That, in brief, is the “problem” of absolute music. (2011, 119) 
One obvious solution to the problem, “popular both in philosophical and music-
theoretical circles,” is to contest appearances and “to deny that absolute music does 
indeed want for literary [or representational] content” (2011, 119). Following arch-
formalist Eduard Hanslick, Kivy thinks such views are hopeless (2011, chaps. 3–7). 
Instead, he insists that a fully satisfactory account of the artistic and aesthetic satisfactions 
of “music alone” must—and can—be given without appeal to any sort of literary or 
representational content (1990; 2011, chaps. 8–11). In this respect, literature and absolute 
music are indeed “antithetical arts.”1 However, the same cannot be said of music in 
general. Despite his formalism, Kivy is deeply sensitive to the representational potential 
of music, which he explores at length in Sound and Semblance (1984) and Osmin’s Rage 
(1988). Focusing primarily on program music and opera, Kivy argues that there are many 
cases in which full appreciation of a work or performance requires attention to the 
music’s representational features. But more controversially, against Roger Scruton (1976), 
 
1 However, Kivy also rejects Hanslick’s “extreme formalism,” according to which “‘[t]he content of music 
is tonally moving forms,’ empty of any other content, emotive content in particular” (2011, 64; quoting 
Hanslick 1986, 28–9). According to Kivy, Hanslick’s mistake was to fail to grasp the possibility of an 
“enhanced formalism,” “a formalism that recognizes emotive properties of music as perceptual, 
phenomenological properties, not semantic or representational ones” (2011, 60, 74; but cf. 64–5). 
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Jenefer Robinson (1987), and Stephen Davies (1993), Kivy claims that, in rare cases, music, 
like painting, can actually provide pictorial experience. This is my topic here.  
However, my concern is not the possibility of musical picturing; I believe that 
Kivy’s arguments—including his replies to Scruton, Robinson, and Davies—conclusively 
establish it (see Kivy 2012). Instead, my goal is to build on Kivy’s work to develop a 
conception of musical pictures—or, more generally, “sonic pictures” (2012, 152)—that is 
sensitive to recent developments in philosophy of perception. As it turns out, Kivy’s 
approach to sonic pictures embeds a commitment to a metaphysics of sounds and hearing 
that significantly restricts the scope of what can be sonically pictured, and recent work in 
philosophy of perception suggests that we have good reason to question this commitment 
and the restriction it entails. In its place, I’ll recommend a view of sounds and hearing 
that yields a considerably more powerful conception of sonic picturing. 
The article is in four parts. Part I presents Kivy’s view of sonic pictures, exposes 
its metaphysical commitments, and identifies two ways to resist them. Part II introduces 
five contemporary views that reject the metaphysical basis of Kivy’s restriction on sonic 
picturing and presents an argument in favor of my preferred view. Part III then 
introduces and responds to a musically motivated objection originally developed by 
Roger Scruton, which insists that reflecting on musical listening should lead us to prefer 
something like Kivy’s view of sounds. Finally, Part IV explores the view of sonic picturing 
entailed by the metaphysics of sounds and hearing that I recommend. Among other 
things, I’ll argue that audio tracks on film and two contemporary musical genres—
beatboxing and cover songs—are best understood in terms of sonic picturing. 
 
I. Kivy on Musical Pictures and the Nature of Sound 
 In exploring the representational capacities of music, Kivy distinguishes 
“pictorial” from “structural” representations (2002, 183; cf. 1984, chap. 2). In the latter, a 
“structural element in the music corresponds with something” extra-musical, such as a 
feature of the accompanying text, “that the structure, so to say, analogizes” (2002, 190). 
For example, according to Kivy, the resolution to D major at the end of Mozart’s Marriage 
of Figaro structurally represents “the resolving of differences among the couples” (2002, 
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190). But while the informed listener may appreciate this representational function, there 
is, Kivy notes, “no question” of simply hearing conjugal harmony in the music: 
There is nothing to ‘hear in’ the music, because the music, in these instances, 
does not represent sound, or sound events, but abstract concepts and things 
seen but not heard. One hears the musical structure, understands the text, 
and perceives, cognizes, the structural analogy. (2002, 190) 
 
By contrast, following Richard Wollheim (1980; 2003), Kivy treats a representation as 
pictorial just in case it allows us to perceive the object of representation in the 
representation itself (2002, 183). This notion of picturing is sense-modality-independent 
and extends, in principle, beyond the visual. Thus, Kivy writes:  
Now visual pictorial representations represent what is seen: we see the 
woman in the Mona Lisa. Likewise, pictorial representations in music, if 
indeed there are any, represent what is heard: we hear in the music whatever 
it pictorially represents. So it seems clear that pictorial representations, if 
any, in music, must be representations of sounds. This does not mean music 
cannot represent other things besides sounds, or paintings things other than 
sights. But they can’t represent them pictorially. (2002, 184; cf. 1984, chap. 
2) 
 
Call the view that “pictorial representations, if any, in music, must be representations of 
sounds” Kivy’s Restriction. Kivy’s Restriction is grounded in a view of sounds and hearing 
that Kivy infrequently articulates and (to my knowledge) never defends. It is view with 
rich philosophical pedigree, and it is shared by Kivy’s main opponent on issues of 
musical representation, Roger Scruton.2 I return to it in a moment; first, though, a bit more 
about Kivy’s view of musical pictures. 
Kivy divides pictorial representations into two basic categories: “aided” and 
“unaided” (2002, 184). An aided pictorial representation is a picture accompanied by 
words that tell us it is a picture and without which we would have probably failed to 
recognize it as such. By contrast, we experience unaided pictorial representations as 
pictures—and can perceive their subjects in them—without having to be told that they 
are pictures. Kivy writes: 
 
2 On issues of musical representation, Kivy and Scruton disagree across the board. Scruton denies that pure 
music has any representational powers (1976). Against Scruton, Kivy argues that, while musical picturing 
is uncommon, it can occur, and structural representations in music are commonplace (1984; 1988; 2002; 
2012). 
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Anyone can see the woman’s face in the Mona Lisa without being told that 
it is a portrait of a lady. But there is a beautiful painting by the British artist 
J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851) in which we can see a sunset in the painting 
only if we know the title: Sunset over Lake…. Without the words there would 
be no ‘seeing in’: only the impression of a non-representational color 
composition. (2002, 184) 
In the case of visual art, the aided pictorial representation is the exception; but, according 
to Kivy, in music, it’s the rule. He claims that examples of aided musical pictures 
“abound,” but “it is very hard to come up with any real, incontestable examples” of the 
unaided type (2002, 185, 184). Even the most obvious cases of musical picturing in the 
Western classical tradition—namely, representations of bird calls in compositions such 
as Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony—are generally flagged as such by titles and other 
accompanying text. In fact, Kivy claims that “it is probably best to give up the point and 
admit that unaided pictorial representation in music is, if possible at all, too rare a 
phenomenon to be counted as belonging to music’s repertoire of aesthetic possibilities” 
(2002, 185). I think it is understandable that Kivy would arrive at this conclusion given 
his focus on classical music. However, in Part IV, I’ll argue that unaided musical picturing 
is both more common and more aesthetically significant than Kivy admits. 
While Kivy seems interested only in musical pictures, he clearly intends his 
account to generalize to “sonic pictures” as such (see esp. 2012, sec. 8.3). Thus, Kivy’s 
Restriction, in full generality, is the view that sonic pictures (musical or otherwise) must 
be pictures of sounds. Now, I have said that this embeds non-trivial metaphysical 
commitments. How so? Well, in general, pictures represent what they do, in part, by 
presenting perceptual appearances shared by their objects. What makes a Rembrandt 
self-portrait a picture of Rembrandt is, in part, that the portrait shares (enough of) 
Rembrandt’s visual appearance. This, above all, is what enables us to see Rembrandt in 
the picture. Any satisfactory theory of depiction must offer an account of exactly how—
and in what sense—pictures capture the perceptual appearances of the objects they 
depict.3 But the point here is that only things that perceptually appear—that is, things that 
have perceptual appearances—can be pictured at all (cf. Hopkins 1998, 28–30). At the 
same time, it seems that whatever perceptually appears is something that can in principle 
be pictured. In sum, then: for sense modality M, an object O might be perceived in an M-
 
3 See Hopkins (1998) and Kulvicki (2006) for two very different approaches to this task. 
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type pictorial representation if and only if O has M-type perceptual appearances. For 
example, many ordinary objects and events (cabbages, cats, clouds) have visual 
appearances; thus, they might be seen in visual pictorial representations—that is, they 
might be visually pictured. Similarly, anything with auditory appearances will be a 
candidate for sonic picturing—for being heard in sonic pictures. Consequently, Kivy’s 
Restriction—that sonic pictures must be pictures of sounds—holds if only if auditory 
appearances belong only to sounds. 
The view that auditory appearances belong only to sounds is a piece of our 
collective empiricist inheritance. As such, it easily masquerades as philosophical common 
sense. Consider the following exchange, which occurs early in the first of Berkeley's Three 
Dialogues: 
PHILONOUS. This point then is agreed between us, that sensible things are 
those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther 
inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight any thing beside 
light, and colours, and figures: or by hearing, any thing but sounds: by the 
palate, any thing beside tastes: by the smell, beside odours: or by the touch, 
more than tangible qualities. 
 
HYLAS. We do not. ([1713] 1992, 138) 
 
In short, we immediately or directly perceive only sensible qualities, which, Philonous 
goes on to argue, exist only insofar as they are perceived. Such a view receives little 
support from contemporary philosophers. It is widely agreed that what we immediately 
perceive are not mind-dependent qualities, but mind-independent objects. In particular, 
what we immediately see and touch are supposed to be ordinary objects such as horses 
and tomatoes. This is not to deny that we see colors and shapes; it is to deny that we see 
the horse by or in virtue of seeing its color or shape. Our visual experience of the horse is 
not “mediated” by the experience of its sensible properties. Similar considerations hold 
for touch. 
Yet the priority accorded to ordinary objects in visual and tactile perception is 
typically not extended to the other sense-modalities. In the case of hearing, this manifests 
itself in two ways. First, philosophers typically follow Berkeley in taking the only direct 
or immediate objects of hearing to be sounds (for instance, O’Callaghan 2007, 13; 2008, 
318; 2009a, 609). On this view, when you witness a musical performance, you directly see 
the performers, but you directly hear only the sounds they make. Second, even if most 
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philosophers reject the Berkeleyan view that sounds are mind-dependent qualities, there 
is still a tendency to think of sounds as independent of their material causes, as somehow 
hovering above or alongside the world of everyday material objects and events (Strawson 
1959, chap. 2; Scruton 1997, chap. 1; 2009; Nudds 2001; 2010; 2014; Martin 2012). Taking 
these two ideas together suggests that the only items that can show up in auditory 
consciousness—and so, bear auditory appearances—are sounds (Nudds 2014). Thus, in 
listening to the musical performance, you may (indirectly) hear the performers, their 
instruments, and their playing, but the only things that genuinely populate your auditory 
consciousness are the sounds that they make. In this case, no musician, instrument, or act 
of playing has ever auditorily appeared to anyone.  
As we’ll see in a moment, the trend in the philosophy of perception is to reject such 
a conservative view of auditory appearances, and this in turn opens the door to a more 
powerful conception of auditory picturing (among other things). First, however, a key 
point: if sounds are the sole bearers of auditory appearances, then sounds must be 
individuals rather than sensible properties.4 Here’s why. In general, bearers of a particular 
sensible property have a corresponding sensory appearance in virtue of bearing that 
property. For example, all red things have a visual appearance—a certain look—in virtue 
of being red. So, if sounds are audible properties, then their bearers have corresponding 
auditory appearances. Furthermore, if sounds are audible properties, then they are 
presumably borne by non-sounds—whether objects (Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008; 2014), 
events (Leddington 2014; 2019), or spatio-temporal regions (as proposed but not 
defended by Cohen 2010, 306). Thus, if sounds are audible properties, then some non-
sounds have auditory appearances. Conversely, if no non-sounds have auditory 
appearances—that is, if only sounds have auditory appearances—then sounds cannot be 
properties; they must be individuals.  
In sum, then, we have:  a. Kivy’s Restriction is true if and only if only sounds have auditory appearances.  b. If only sounds have auditory appearances, then sounds are individuals.  
 
4 I’m assuming that these options exhaust the possibilities. Supposing that the world consists of individuals 
with properties, then, given that sounds are perceivable, they must either be individuals with sensible 
properties or sensible properties themselves. 
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To resist Kivy’s Restriction we must above all resist the idea that only sounds have 
auditory appearances. There are two ways to do this. First, we might accept that sounds 
are individuals but insist that some non-sounds nevertheless have auditory appearances. 
Second, we might reject the view that sounds are individuals in favor of a view of sounds 
as sensible properties. In Part II, I consider both of these strategies and offer independent 
reasons in favor of the latter. 
 
II. Resisting Kivy’s Restriction 
To resist Kivy’s Restriction, an individualist about sounds must allow that some 
non-sounds have auditory appearances. Here four contemporary views seem promising. 
First, according to Parthood, sounds are events—disturbings of media—that are 
proper parts of their medium-involving event sources (see O’Callaghan 2007; 2009b; 2010; 
2011). For example, when a baseball collides with a bat, the sound (the disturbing of the 
air) is a proper part of its source (the ball-bat-collision-in-air). Given that sounds have 
audible features, Parthood entails that some non-sounds—namely, sound sources—have 
“parts with audible features,” and so, auditory appearances (O’Callaghan 2011, 396). 
According to O’Callaghan, this allows us to explain an important phenomenological 
datum: namely, that we can hear sound sources along with their sounds in such a way 
that “the audible source and the audible sound are not simply phenomenologically 
unified—they share an audible appearance” (2011, 397–8). Thus, Parthood seems to 
permit some non-sounds to appear auditorily. 
Second, Identity holds that sounds are identical with their event sources (see Casati 
and Dokic (1994) and Casati et al. (2013)). When the ball collides with the bat, the collision 
is the sound, and so, a bearer of audible features such as pitch and loudness. This means 
that ordinary noisy events such as collisions have auditory appearances. Strictly 
speaking, this view is compatible with Kivy’s Restriction, since the Identity theorist can 
hold that all and only sounds have auditory appearances. At the same time, by 
identifying sounds with their ordinary event sources, Identity locates auditory 
appearances in a manner at odds with the spirit of Kivy’s Restriction. Contra Kivy, 
Identity holds that any noisy event has auditory appearances, and so, is a possible object 
of musical picturing. In this respect, the Identity theorist can officially embrace Kivy’s 
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Restriction even while massively extending the scope of what might be auditorily—and 
so, musically—pictured. 
Third, according to Plurality, audible qualities such as pitch and loudness can be 
borne by both noisy everyday events (collisions, etc.) and sounds understood as “pure 
audibilia”—that is, as metaphysical individuals somehow independent of events and 
objects that we can see or touch (Soteriou 2018). By denying that sounds alone bear 
audible qualities—and so, auditory appearances—Plurality is straightforwardly 
incompatible with Kivy’s Restriction. 
Finally, according to Abstracta, sounds are repeatable, or abstract, individuals 
(Nudds 2001, 221–2; Martin 2012, 345–6). On this view, sounds resemble properties (or 
universals) in virtue the fact that they can be spatially and temporally “multiply located” 
(Martin 2012, 345). The idea is that sounds are more like letters or words than ordinary 
material objects or events: just as the inscription ‘tick tick tick’ repeats the same linguistic 
individual—namely, the word ‘tick’—the ticking clock repeats the same sonic individual—
namely, the ticking sound—at regular intervals. Proponents of this view argue that, 
despite being property-like, sounds are not properties especially because: (a) we talk 
about sounds as if they’re individuals; and (b) unlike properties, sounds are in various 
ways separable from their material sources (Nudds 2001; 2010; Martin 2012). However, 
as discussed in Part I, the idea that sounds are separable from, or “float off” their material 
sources readily suggests that auditory appearances belong to sounds alone (Martin 2012, 
334). Nevertheless, Matthew Nudds has recently argued at length that, even someone 
who endorses Abstracta can—and should—accept that sometimes “material 
events…themselves are apparent to us in auditory experience” (2014, 482). If his 
argument is successful, then even Abstracta might provide the means with which to resist 
Kivy’s Restriction. 
All four of these views—Parthood, Identity, Plurality, and Abstracta—insist that 
sounds are individuals. To this extent, they remain compatible with Kivy’s Restriction; 
but inasmuch as they more widely distribute auditory appearances, they provide means 
to resist it. Even among philosophers who treat sounds as individuals, there is a growing 
consensus that, in one way or another, ordinary noisy events such as collisions can 
genuinely appear in auditory consciousness. In this respect, the trend is to say that what 
we hear, strictly speaking, are not just sounds, but their sources—the ordinary noisy 
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events that populate our surroundings. This suggests a more direct route to resisting 
Kivy’s Restriction. 
Property holds that sounds are audible properties of their event sources 
(Leddington 2014; 2019). Noisy events such as collisions and vibrations can be described 
as bearing audible qualities such as pitch, timbre, and loudness (Casati, Di Bona, and 
Dokic 2013; Soteriou 2018). According to Property, those audible qualities constitute the 
sound of the event; in other words, sounds are event-borne audible-quality complexes.  This 
keeps with philosophical tradition by classing sounds alongside colors among the 
sensible qualities. However, tradition also treats sounds (like canonical colors) as 
properties of objects (Locke [1690] 1975, II, viii, 14; Pasnau 1999; Kulvicki 2008).5 So, by 
taking sounds for properties of events, Property breaks with tradition.6 In any case, 
because an object’s perceptible qualities do not mediate our perceptual contact with it, 
Property has the following critical consequence: just as we see objects in (but not by or in 
virtue of) seeing their colors, so we hear the event sources of sounds in (but not by or in 
virtue of) hearing their sounds.7 And just as the primary objects of vision are not colors 
per se, but color-bearing objects, the primary objects of hearing are not sounds per se, but 
sound-bearing events. In other words, according to Property, we never hear mere noise, 
only noisy events, and the primary bearers of auditory appearances are not sounds, but 
their event sources. 
So far, then, we have five ways to resist Kivy’s Restriction (see Table 1). These views 
differ significantly, and we should expect that they will have different consequences for 
the scope and nature of auditory picturing. But which should we prefer? I have argued 
elsewhere that considerations of theoretical simplicity—both ontological and syntactic—
 
5 Why canonical colors? Because arguably some events, such as explosions and other light-emitters, have 
colors, too. Indeed, according to Property, if we’re going to think of sounds by analogy with colors, we 
should of them by analogy with the colors of events, so that the sound of an explosion is the auditory analog 
of its color (Leddington 2019, 625). 
6 And for good reason. The view that sounds are properties of objects is prima facie implausible. Most 
sounds have temporal profiles that differ substantially from those of everyday objects and their properties. 
The bell that you ring both predates and outlasts the sound of its ringing; the bell does not, however, 
predate or outlast its color, shape, or size. This is a reflection of the fact that sounds are event-like, not 
object-like. Arguably, then, if sounds are sensible properties, they are sensible properties of events, not of 
objects. 
7 On these uses of the phrases ‘in’, ‘by’, and ‘in virtue of’, see Leddington (2014, 323–5). 
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give us reason to prefer Property to both Parthood and Identity (2019). I think similar 
considerations tell against Plurality and Abstracta. Like Property, Plurality recognizes 
that the primary objects of hearing include ordinary events bearing auditory qualities 
such as pitch, timbre, and loudness. But while Property stops there, Plurality also insists, 
along with Abstracta, on the existence of “pure audibilia”—that is, objects of audition 
that float free of material sources. These, they say, are “sounds.” But I see no reason to 
recognize the existence of such things, and, other things being equal, we should prefer a 
view that dispenses with them. Of course, proponents of pure audibilia argue that we 
nevertheless have reason to recognize the existence of such objects. While fully 
adjudicating this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I turn in Part III to one of the 
more important arguments that have led philosophers to this separability thesis: Roger 
Scruton’s argument from acousmatic experience. 
 
Table 1. 
View? Parthood Identity Plurality Abstracta Property 
Primary 
objects of 
hearing 
are… 
Sounds Sounds Sounds 
or  
Events bearing 
audible qualities 
(pitch, etc.) 
Sounds Events bearing 
audible qualities 
(pitch, etc.) 
Sounds 
are… 
Proper parts of 
their event 
sources 
Identical with 
their event 
sources 
Pure audibilia 
(abstract 
individuals) 
Pure audibilia 
(abstract 
individuals) 
Audible-quality 
complexes borne 
by events 
 
 
III. Scruton’s Argument from Acousmatic Experience 
 When discussing whether music can represent everyday objects and events such 
as a “quarrel” or a “forest fire,” Scruton writes that 
a sound is [an individual] detachable from the object that emits it, and…is 
capable of independent existence. However, it is the sound, not the object, 
that ‘appears’ in the music. How, then, can the music represent the subjects 
[such as quarrels] that are normally ascribed to it, when those subjects share 
no appearance with the music? (1976, 277–8, my emphasis) 
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According to Scruton, it cannot. As we’ve seen, Kivy’s answer is more circumspect: the 
music cannot represent such things pictorially, only structurally. Yet beneath this 
disagreement lies a shared view of the nature of sounds as self-standing objects of 
perception and the sole bearers of auditory appearances.8 Despite their many differences, 
this is a significant alignment and the source of Kivy’s conviction that sounds alone can 
be musically pictured. My aim in this section is to undercut the temptation to this view, 
which, I think, is easily felt when reflecting on the experience of listening to music. 
 At the heart of Scruton’s philosophy of music is the idea that it is possible to 
perceptually attend to sounds without attending to their sources. Such “abstract 
listening” yields what he calls “acousmatic” experience (Scruton 1997, chap. 1; 2009; 
2010). Along with Casey O'Callaghan (2011, 380) and Michael Martin (2012, 333–4), 
Scruton thinks the possibility of acousmatic experience suggests an independence of 
sounds and sources incompatible with treating sounds as properties. He writes: 
Sounds can be detached completely from their source, as by radio or 
gramophone, and listened to in isolation. This experience—the 
“acousmatic” experience of sound—removes nothing that is essential to the 
sound as an object of attention. The striking thing is that sounds, thus 
emancipated from their causes, are experienced as independent but related 
objects, which form coherent complexes with boundaries and 
simultaneities, parts and wholes. (2009, 58)  
 
Now, if particular sounds can “be detached completely” from their sources, then it is hard 
to see how they could be sensible properties of their sources, as I suggest. Sensible 
properties cannot be detached from their bearers.9 Thus, if particular sounds “can be 
detached completely” from their sources, then my view is in trouble. 
 Yet it seems odd to say that listening to a recording of a musical performance 
involves listening to sounds that have been “detached” or “emancipated” from their 
sources. The fact that you can capture the sound of a musical performance and play it 
back no more shows that sounds can be detached from their sources than the fact that 
 
8 It’s worth noting that I do not mean that Kivy would accept Scruton’s hefty metaphysical commitment to 
sounds as non-physical “pure events” (2009). Kivy seems wary of such extravagant metaphysical claims. 
9 This requires clarification. Sensible property instances cannot be detached from their bearers. Of course, 
qua universals, sensible properties are separable from particular property bearers. But this is not the sort of 
separability Scruton has in mind. He believes that particular sound instances are separable from their 
sources. 
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you can capture the color and shape of a flower in a photograph shows that color and 
shape can be detached from the flower.10 Still, it may be easier to listen acousmatically 
when hearing music played over an audio system than when witnessing a live 
performance. On the other hand, listening to a musical recording hardly guarantees an 
acousmatic experience. An audiophile or sound engineer might attend to the music and, 
at the same time, to how the speakers sound. A guitarist might marvel at the warmth of 
Wes Montgomery's guitar. And if you listen to Glenn Gould play Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations, you might find yourself annoyingly distracted by his humming—hardly an 
acousmatic experience.11 So, hearing a musical recording played over an audio system 
does not prevent the listener from attending to the sources of the sounds that she hears. 
Nevertheless, Scruton’s main point seems to be that, when we do listen acousmatically, 
we experience sounds as individuals that “form coherent complexes with boundaries and 
simultaneities, parts and wholes,” and I think that there is something to this; it does not, 
however, tell against Property. 
 Here is why: exactly the same sort of experience is possible not only with color, 
but also with shape. Take color. Certain forms of abstract visual art, such as color field 
painting and abstract film, encourage the viewer to visually attend to expanses of color 
without attending to their bearer(s).12 In viewing such work, colors may seem to float free 
of the objects that bear them and appear as individuals that “form coherent complexes 
with boundaries and simultaneities, parts and wholes.” This does not, of course, tell 
against the view that colors are properties rather than individuals. That something can 
be an independent object of attention is no reason to think that it is an object. And that 
 
10 The notion of “capture” here should be taken loosely. In particular, it should not be taken to require the 
sort of “matching” of color and shape criticized by Ernst Gombrich ([1960] 2000). Arguably, the key task 
for a theory of depiction is to explain how appearances can be captured without being “matched.” 
11 This introduces the question whether audio recordings are transparent, such that, in listening to a 
recording of Gould humming, you can be said literally to hear Gould hum, or whether, strictly speaking, you 
hear only the recording. For what it’s worth, I do not think that this question can be answered 
independently of particular pragmatic circumstances. Furthermore, I think that any general argument 
against the transparency of audio recordings (or photographs and videos) would effectively beg the 
question by employing an objectionably ad hoc condition on “genuine perception.” (Compare Walton (1984 
esp. notes 11 and 15) and Martin (2012, pt. 4).) 
12 Consider, for instance, the “visual music” of Oskar Fischinger, some of which can be experienced online 
thanks to the Center for Visual Music: http://www.centerforvisualmusic.org/Fischinger/. 
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you can attend to A without attending to B does not show that A is independent of or 
separable from B; it shows only that A and B are nonidentical—and of course a property 
instance is not identical to its bearer. So, too, consider shape. In a well-known technique 
for teaching figure drawing, students are asked to attend to the shapes of objects while 
ignoring their identity, as it is easier to draw the shape of a nose than it is to draw a nose. 
Students accomplish this by attending to the “negative space” defined by the contours of 
the nose, and so, attentionally (but only attentionally!) detach the shape of the nose from 
the nose itself.  
 In sum, then, the possibility of acousmatic experience does not tell against the 
property view of sounds. Property holds that sounds are distinct (though not separate or 
separable) from their sources, and this is sufficient to underwrite the possibility of 
acousmatic experience. 
 However, even if the possibility of acousmatic experience does not tell against the 
Property View, there appears to be an important difference between abstract listening 
and abstract visual experience of color or shape. As Kivy notes in Music Alone, it seems 
significantly easier to attentionally abstract a sound from its source than a color or shape 
from its bearer (1990, chap. 1; cf. O’Callaghan 2020, sec. 4.1). This demands explanation. 
Possibly it indicates that sounds are individuals rather than properties, as attentionally 
isolating a particular is plausibly easier than attentionally isolating a property. But there 
is an alternative. We can explain the relative ease of abstract listening without appeal to 
a particular metaphysics of sounds—namely, as a consequence of the relative epistemic 
poverty of audition. The relative epistemic poverty of audition consists in the fact that, 
typically, what we know on a purely auditory basis about what we hear is substantially 
less than what we know on a purely visual basis about what we see.13 In particular, 
hearing alone often leaves us unsure exactly what we have heard, which would seem to 
make it easier to—in Martin Heidegger’s words—“listen away from things, divert our 
 
13 The idea is that hearing is generally epistemically impoverished relative to vision. Of course, there are 
cases where hearing can tell us things that sight cannot. This is trivially true in the dark, but there are plenty 
of cases where hearing allows us to access things we cannot see. Looking at the wall will generally not tell 
you where the studs lie; better to knock and listen for the hollow between them. Car horns are useful in 
part because drivers have blind spots. Typically, however, sight provides much richer information about 
our surroundings than hearing does. Thus, you will be less likely to miss when driving the nail if you can 
see the stud; and you may need to turn your head to see exactly where the honking car is located. 
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ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly” (1977, 52). On this view, the epistemology of hearing, 
not the metaphysics of sounds, explains why “the ear, far more than the eye, is capable 
of sustained perceiving in an abstract, non-interpretive mode” (Kivy 1990, 5). 
 But how exactly does relative epistemic poverty entail relative ease of abstract 
perceiving? My hypothesis is that vision’s epistemic richness imposes a cognitive—and 
attentional—burden that interferes with abstract perception of properties such as color 
and shape. In ordinary circumstances, when you open your eyes, not only is there is a 
great deal to notice, there is a great deal that you involuntarily do notice. For example, in 
looking at the tomato before you, you visually notice not only that it is a tomato with a 
certain color, but also that it has a particular shape and size, that it is lying on a particular 
surface, casting a certain shadow, and so on. You also visually notice a great deal about 
the surrounding space. You notice all of this as a matter of course, without any particular 
effort, and you cannot help but notice most of it. The fundamental passivity of most 
perceptual recognition is frequently overlooked, but helps to explain the relative 
difficulty of abstract seeing. The bare visual presence of the tomato passively activates a 
host of visual recognitive capacities; the result is that you automatically see the redness 
of the tomato as the color of a particular item in a complex scene. This way of experiencing 
the color of the tomato is foisted on you, and it will compete with any attempt to see that 
color instance abstractly. The result is a kind of cognitive tug-of-war between involuntary 
visual recognition and attentional abstraction.  
 If this hypothesis is correct, then it should be possible to facilitate attentional 
abstraction by reducing the number of perceptual recognitive capacities passively 
activated by an experience. Indeed, as it turns out, attentionally abstracting the color of 
the tomato seems easier if it takes up most of your field of view, or if you visually simplify 
the rest of the scene. For example, you might place the tomato alone on a white tabletop, 
or (better) deploy a visually neutral screen to obscure everything but a blemish-free patch 
of tomato-surface. Apparently, such strategies work because they reduce cognitive load 
(abstract perception is cognitively demanding) and the degree to which we cannot help 
but see the redness as the color of one particular object among others.14 
 
14 This explains why it seems easier to attentionally abstract the color of a blank wall than that of an object 
in a complex scene. Thus, too, the exercise from the famous instructional manual, Drawing on the Right Side 
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 The phenomenon cuts across sense-modalities. Some concert-goers shut their eyes 
to better attend to the “music alone.” Reducing extraneous perceptual recognition 
facilitates the intended attentional abstraction. Here, the key point is that, in normal cases 
of pure auditory experience, there is relatively little to notice. Arguably, on shutting your 
eyes in the concert hall, you cannot help but auditorily notice that a piano is being played 
somewhere in front of you; but, provided that the hall is quiet, this hardly compares to 
the wealth of perceptual noticing that automatically accompanies an ordinary visual 
experience. The vast majority of what is perceptually noticed in a purely auditory 
experience of a musical performance is about the sound itself, and this is all we need to 
explain the relative ease of abstract listening. 
While the details of this account require further development, this is just one 
approach to explaining the relative ease of abstract listening by appealing to epistemic 
features of audition rather than to the metaphysics of sounds. In fact, Kivy himself offers 
another such explanation, based on the idea that, thanks to its epistemic richness, vision 
has greater survival value than hearing (1990: Ch. 1).15 Whether you accept my argument 
or prefer Kivy’s explanation is irrelevant. The key is that there is no easy inference from 
the relative ease of abstract listening to the claim that sounds are individuals rather than 
properties.  
In sum, then, the phenomenon of acousmatic experience gives us no reason to 
accept that objects of hearing can float free of material processes as both Plurality and 
Abstracta require. And while I cannot fully settle this issue here—there are other 
 
of the Brain (Edwards 2012). The beginner is asked to copy Picasso’s drawing of Stravinsky both upside-
down and right-side-up. Copying it upside-down yields a much better result, apparently because looking 
at the Picasso upside-down interferes with perceptual recognition, and so, facilitates attentional abstraction 
of shape. The next step is learning the technique described above: focusing attention on negative space 
rather than on the objects themselves. This is a way of deploying attention that interferes with involuntary 
perceptual recognition of the object. 
15 Kivy’s primarily aim is to explain why “visual music” of the sort mentioned above (note 15) is less 
successful than auditory music. He thinks this is explained by the relative ease with which we listen 
abstractly (itself explained in evolutionary terms). I am not convinced by this. I think the relative power of 
music has more to do with how we subjectively experience even fully abstracted color vs. sound. Consider, 
for example, that musical dissonance seems to have a potency—and so, to call for resolution—in way 
altogether unmatched by even the most intense color conflict. There is no obvious relationship between 
this fact and the relative ease of abstract listening. 
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arguments to consider—Scruton’s argument is one of a class of arguments that seeks to 
draw radical metaphysical conclusions from features of auditory experience that can be 
neatly explained in other ways.16 As such, these arguments are all quite weak. They 
certainly should not embarrass anyone who aspires to give a full account of auditory 
phenomena by appeal to no more than ordinary noisy events and their audible qualities, 
just as Property insists.17 
 
IV. From Sound in Sound to Event in Event 
In Part II, I discussed five main contemporary theories of hearing and sound: 
Parthood, Identity, Plurality, Abstracta, and Property. All of these views allow that some 
non-sounds appear auditorily. Thus, it is fair to say that, since whatever appears 
auditorily can in principle be sonically pictured, there is a growing consensus that, contra 
Kivy, some non-sounds can be objects of sonic picturing. Next, I argued that, on the basis 
of theoretical parsimony, we should prefer Property to the other candidate views, and I 
defended Property against a well-worn objection from musical listening. In the remainder 
of this article, I want to explore Property’s consequences for sonic picturing. 
Property doesn’t just resist Kivy’s Restriction; it turns it on its head. According to 
Property, just as colors are properties borne by objects (and sometimes events), sounds 
are audible-quality complexes borne by ordinary noisy events such as collisions. 
Moreover, just as color-bearers, but not colors, are the primary objects of vision, so sound-
bearing events, but not sounds, are the primary objects of hearing. In this case, then, it 
will typically be just as inappropriate to say that sonic pictures are pictures of sounds as 
it is to say that visual picture are pictures of colors. Instead, just as visual pictures are 
canonically pictures of objects, so sonic pictures will be pictures of events. Of course, 
visual pictures of objects also depict visible properties—most obviously, shape and 
color—but those properties are represented as properties of the represented objects. In this 
respect, the representation of the visible properties is secondary or derivative. For 
 
16 See, for instance, the arguments involving loudspeakers and other supposedly abnormal sound sources 
in Nudds (2010). 
17 Notably, Identity also insists on this. However, it makes the mistake of identifying sounds with their 
event sources, rather than with the audible qualities of their event sources. Again, for discussion, see 
Leddington (2019). 
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example, Jan Van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait depicts a woman in a green dress. Does it 
therefore depict a particular shade of green? Yes, but only secondarily: as the color of a 
particular dress. Similarly, if Property is correct, then sonic pictures will necessarily 
depict the sounds of the events that they represent, but those sounds will be represented 
only secondarily: as properties of their source events. So, consider the birdsong cadenza in 
the second movement of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony. What does it depict? Property 
suggests that the primary object of depiction—what a properly informed listener hears in 
the music—is not mere bird sounds, but a noisy everyday event: birds singing. Does the 
music also depict bird sounds? Sure, but only secondarily: as the sound of birds singing. 
And note that this account matches Beethoven’s intention in giving the movement the 
programmatic title, “Szene am Bach,” or “Scene by the Brook,” rather than “Geräusche einer 
Szene am Bach,” or “Sounds of a Scene by the Brook.” 
Kivy’s late paper on musical picturing is entitled “Sound in Sound.” This is how 
he thinks sonic pictures work: we hear sounds in sounds. The view I recommend differs 
doubly. When we encounter a sonic picture, what we hear, first and foremost, is an 
event—for example, the playing of a flute. That we experience this event pictorially 
means that we hear in it another event—for example, the singing of a nightingale. So, it’s 
not “sound in sound,” but “event in event.” 
Here’s a nice consequence of this shift. When we watch representational films, we 
also perceive events in events. More precisely, we see worldly events—often involving 
people—in projection events on a screen. I propose that, just as we experience the 
projection event on the screen as a moving visual picture of worldly events, so we 
experience the amplified playback of the film’s audio track as a sonic picture of some of 
those same events. Thus, we can see in the on-screen projection event precisely the same 
event—a conversation, say—that we hear in the playback of the audio track. Against this, 
you might insist that our auditory experience in this case is not pictorial: we do not hear 
in the playback of the audio track the characters speaking; instead, we just hear voices, 
the sounds of which we involuntarily associate with the visually depicted goings-on in 
the film. But I find this implausible and untrue to the phenomenology. Just as the on-
screen visual picture is visibly not a live scene, the playback of the audio track is audibly 
not a live conversation. Indeed, what Robert Hopkins writes of the visual case is equally 
true of the auditory case: “We seem to see [and hear!] directly neither the events filmed 
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nor the events of the story told. We are always, plainly, looking at [and listening to!] 
pictures, and so our experience of those events is only ever seeing [and hearing!] them in 
the [visuo-auditory!] image before us” (2008, 153; see also 2010). Naturally, this view 
needs further development and defense, but note that it provides a very tidy explanation 
of why we experience the audio and visual components of film presentations to be 
thoroughly fused: they depict the very same events. Our experience of film is a case of 
unified, simultaneous seeing- and hearing-in. 
Returning to the case of musical picturing, consider one of Kivy’s main examples: 
The twentieth-century French composer Arthur Honegger (1892–1955) 
wrote a famous piece for orchestra called Pacific 231. A ‘Pacific’ is a kind of 
steam railway locomotive, and Honegger’s composition represents the 
sound of the engine starting up, barreling along at top speed, slowing 
down, and finally coming to rest. (2002: 185) 
 
According to Kivy, we hear in the sound of the music the sound of a locomotive. By 
contrast, according to Property, a performance of Honegger’s composition pictorially 
represents not just the sounds of the locomotive’s activity, but also the activity itself: “the 
engine starting up, barreling along at top speed, slowing down, and finally coming to 
rest.” In other words, we hear in one event (the performance) another event (the activity 
of the locomotive). (We also, of course, hear in it the sounds of the locomotive, but again: 
only secondarily.) Similar emendations apply to Kivy’s other cases. For instance, in 
“Sound in Sound,” he argues that “the Dead March [in Handel’s Saul is]…a musical 
picture of a dead march or a dead-march picture,” and is in that sense “a musical picture 
of musical sound” (2012, 157). By contrast, I would describe this as a case where one 
event—the musical performance of the Dead March in Handel’s Saul—pictorially 
represents another event: the musical performance of an Old Testament funeral march. 
 Now, the Dead March in Saul is a clear case of what Kivy calls “aided” musical 
picturing. Without the accompanying text, we’d never even know that the performance 
was meant as a representation. Though it’s less clear, Kivy thinks the same is probably 
true of Honegger’s Pacific 231 (2002, 185). But if so, is he right “that unaided pictorial 
representation in music is, if possible at all, too rare a phenomenon to be counted as 
belonging to music’s repertoire of aesthetic possibilities” (2002, 185)? No—I think this is 
a mistake, though it’s understandable given Kivy’s focus on Western classical music. 
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Thus, I’ll wrap up this section by describing what I take to be two relatively 
unproblematic cases of unaided musical pictures. 
 Case one: beatboxing. Beatboxing is “a vocal percussion practice in hip-hop music,” 
so-called because it developed “from the desire to imitate beatboxes, the first generation 
of the drum machine” (Bell 2019, 1967). In one of the earliest recorded examples, beatbox 
pioneer Doug E. Fresh (“The Human Beatbox”) provides a full beatbox accompaniment 
to MC Ricky D’s rapped vocals in the song, “La Di Da Di” (1985). Since then, beatboxing 
has developed into a internationally popular, self-standing musical genre in which artists 
imitate a wide variety of sounds—musical and non-musical—in improvised musical 
performances. The key point for present purposes is that, without any accompanying 
text, beatbox performances readily provoke hearing-in. For example, at the beginning of 
“La Di Da Di,” it’s nigh impossible not to hear in Doug E. Fresh’s beatboxing the playing 
of an early electronic drum machine. The artistry of the beatboxer is precisely to induce 
vivid and surprising experiences of hearing in without having to tell the audience what 
to expect. 
Case two: cover songs. Magnus et al. offer the following sufficient condition for being 
a cover: “A version of a song is a cover when it is recorded or performed by an artist or a 
group who did not write and compose the song themselves and where there is a prior 
recording which is accepted as canonical or paradigmatic” (2013, 362). I propose that, in 
many—and perhaps most—cases, covers are unaided musical pictures.  Oftentimes, we 
can hear the canonical track in the cover, and this constitutes a good bit of our aesthetic 
interest in it, even if the cover is also independently musically interesting. For example, in 
listening to Stevie Ray Vaughan’s masterful instrumental cover of Jimi Hendrix’s “Little 
Wing,” we can hear in it both the guitar and vocals of the canonical Hendrix track, and 
much of the pleasure we take in listening lies in appreciating Vaughan’s ability to allow 
us to do so even while producing a very different piece of music. Moreover, in most cases, 
properly appreciating a cover aesthetically requires the sort of familiarity with the 
canonical track that allows you to recognize the cover as a cover without aid of words or 
titles. Just knowing that it’s a cover is not enough. If you can’t hear the canonical version 
in the cover—that is, if all you hear are the cover’s surface features—then you are missing 
out on something aesthetically essential about the work. 
————— 
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Despite Kivy’s attention to it, musical—and, more generally, sonic—picturing has 
been neglected by philosophers.18 This is unfortunate, and not merely because depiction 
has become central to the field of philosophical aesthetics. If I’m right, then sonic 
picturing is both more common and more aesthetically important than Kivy ever 
allowed. Indeed, appreciating and understanding the possibility of sonic picturing seems 
critical to understanding a variety of important auditory phenomena—musical and 
otherwise.19 
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